Hes­si­an Hig­her Labour Court comm­ents on the right to infor­ma­ti­on in data pro­tec­tion law in accordance with Artic­le 15 GDPR

In no less than two rulings dated 10 June 2021 (Case 9 Sa 1431/19 and Case 9 Sa 861/20) (only in Ger­man), the Hig­her Labour Court of Hes­se dealt with the right to infor­ma­ti­on under data pro­tec­tion law in accordance with Artic­le 15 GDPR and spe­ci­fied the scope and pro­ce­du­re for pro­vi­ding infor­ma­ti­on in more detail. In addi­ti­on, the Hig­her Labour Court comm­ents on abu­se of a request for information.

Scope of a gene­ral cla­im to information

In the decis­i­ons, the plain­ti­ff, the for­mer employee of the defen­dant com­pa­ny, had reques­ted the lat­ter to pro­vi­de him infor­ma­ti­on pur­su­ant to Artic­le 15 GDPR. The plain­ti­ff was ter­mi­na­ted for extra­or­di­na­ry cau­se after the public pro­se­cu­tor initia­ted an inves­ti­ga­ti­on into serious gang-related fraud at the expen­se of the defen­dant. The defen­dant did not com­ply with the plaintiff’s request for infor­ma­ti­on, which was ulti­m­ate­ly asser­ted in the legal action, with refe­rence to legi­ti­ma­te inte­rests in con­fi­den­tia­li­ty on account of the cri­mi­nal pro­cee­dings and on account of the cla­im asser­ted in what it con­side­red to be an abu­se of rights.

The Labour Court of Wies­ba­den gran­ted the action in both cases. In its con­clu­si­ons, the Labour Court cla­ri­fies that the right to infor­ma­ti­on pur­su­ant to § 34(1)i (only in Ger­man) in con­junc­tion with § 29(1), Sen­tence 2 (only in Ger­man) of the Fede­ral Data Pro­tec­tion Act (BDSG) is only rest­ric­ted “inso­far as” infor­ma­ti­on is dis­c­lo­sed which must be kept secret in accordance with a legal pro­vi­si­on or by its natu­re, par­ti­cu­lar­ly becau­se of the over­ri­ding legi­ti­ma­te inte­rests of a third par­ty. Howe­ver, the defen­dant here only made a gene­ral refe­rence to con­fi­den­tia­li­ty inte­rests and it remain­ed unclear to what per­so­nal data of the plain­ti­ff the alle­ged inte­rests wort­hy of pro­tec­tion would refer. In addi­ti­on, the asser­ti­on of the clam to infor­ma­ti­on was not an abu­se of rights in the terms of § 242 of the Civil Code (only in German).

The defen­dant had appea­led against the ruling, citing, among other things, that it was up to the plain­ti­ff to spe­ci­fy the data reques­ted. Moreo­ver, it could not be expec­ted to dif­fe­ren­tia­te bet­ween data that were “cri­ti­cal to the inves­ti­ga­ti­on” and data that were “not cri­ti­cal to the investigation”.

The Hig­her Labour Court dis­missed the appeal as lack­ing merit, sta­ting that the scope of the duty to pro­vi­de infor­ma­ti­on, which had not been ful­fil­led at all by the defen­dant to date, resul­ted from the GDPR its­elf and thus the plain­ti­ff could not be requi­red to limit his request for infor­ma­ti­on and dis­clo­sure through more spe­ci­fic for­mu­la­ti­ons than tho­se requi­red by the Regu­la­ti­on. The level of detail of the infor­ma­ti­on to be pro­vi­ded should be based on Con­side­ra­ti­on 63 of the GDPR (only in Ger­man). Accor­ding to the lat­ter, the pur­po­se of the cla­im to infor­ma­ti­on is for the data sub­ject to be awa­re of the pro­ces­sing and to be able to veri­fy its lawfulness.

Accor­ding to the Hig­her Labour Court, this can be used to jus­ti­fy a gra­dua­ted bur­den of ful­fill­ment: Only what is reques­ted has to be ful­fil­led. This initi­al­ly includes the “mas­ter data” of the per­son entit­led to infor­ma­ti­on. In the case of a gene­ral cla­im to infor­ma­ti­on – as in the pre­sent case – only the “fol­lo­wing infor­ma­ti­on” pur­su­ant to Artic­le 15(1), Second Clau­se of the GDPR must be pro­vi­ded. In addi­ti­on to the so-called “mas­ter data”, the other infor­ma­ti­on cover­ed by Artic­le 15(1) GDPR must be pro­vi­ded, i.e. the infor­ma­ti­on pur­su­ant to Artic­le 15(1), Lite­ri a to h GDPR must be pro­vi­ded cumulatively.

High hurd­les for the rejec­tion of a cla­im for infor­ma­ti­on due to abu­se of rights

The Hig­her Labour Court also took a clo­ser look at the abu­se of requests for infor­ma­ti­on and the pos­si­bi­li­ties of defen­ding against the request.

The plain­ti­ff had also jus­ti­fied his cla­im for infor­ma­ti­on by sta­ting that he might need the data to defend hims­elf in the ongo­ing inves­ti­ga­ti­ve pro­cee­dings and to defend and enforce civil claims.

The defen­dant objec­ted inter alia that the cla­im for infor­ma­ti­on had been asser­ted abu­si­ve­ly. In its view, the right to infor­ma­ti­on does not ser­ve to prepa­re civil claims and make them more enforceable, but to make data pro­ces­sing more trans­pa­rent. In the pre­sent case, the plain­ti­ff is mere­ly see­king a way to harm his for­mer employer.

The Hig­her Labour Court did not con­sider the pre­re­qui­si­tes for a limi­ta­ti­on of the right to infor­ma­ti­on due to an abu­se of rights to be met: No limi­ta­ti­on of the cla­im to infor­ma­ti­on is pro­vi­ded for in the event the infor­ma­ti­on of the data sub­ject would affect the enforce­ment of civil claims of the data con­trol­ler or con­ta­ins data from civil con­tracts or ser­ves to pre­vent dama­ge cau­sed by cri­mi­nal acts.

The Hig­her Labour Court of Sax­o­ny recent­ly issued a much more business-friendly ruling on this issue.


The decis­i­ons once again show that requests for infor­ma­ti­on under data pro­tec­tion law remain an extre­me­ly important issue, espe­ci­al­ly in rela­ti­on to employees. It is the­r­e­fo­re essen­ti­al for com­pa­nies to keep a regis­ter of pro­ces­sing acti­vi­ties and to careful­ly docu­ment the data pro­ces­sed about employees in order to be pre­pared for pos­si­ble claims for information.


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