Admi­nis­tra­ti­ve Offen­ces in Pro­duct Law

Why Pro­duct Com­pli­ance is the Dif­fe­rence Bet­ween Fines and Exoneration

Regu­la­to­ry requi­re­ments for com­pa­nies in pro­duct law are incre­asing signi­fi­cant­ly: in the are­as of pro­duct safe­ty and pro­duct lia­bi­li­ty, but par­ti­cu­lar­ly regar­ding risks rela­ted to admi­nis­tra­ti­ve offen­ces. In fede­ral law alo­ne, the­re are around 1,800 acts and 2,900 sta­tu­to­ry instru­ments encom­pas­sing appro­xi­m­ate­ly 96,000 indi­vi­du­al pro­vi­si­ons; 17,000 of the­se pro­vi­si­ons impo­se an admi­nis­tra­ti­ve bur­den on busi­nesses. Among the­se are well over 1,000 admi­nis­tra­ti­ve offence pro­vi­si­ons. Not least, the Euro­pean Uni­on’s har­mo­ni­sa­ti­on legis­la­ti­on obli­ges Mem­ber Sta­tes to enact sanc­tio­ning provisions.

Cur­rent prac­ti­ce demons­tra­tes: admi­nis­tra­ti­ve (regu­la­to­ry) fine pro­cee­dings often begin with a label­ling or pro­duct defect, but their out­co­me is fre­quent­ly deci­ded by the orga­ni­sa­ti­on of pro­duct com­pli­ance structures.

The OWiG as the Cen­tral Enforce­ment Mecha­nism in Pro­duct Law

Pro­duct law is based on an inter­play of:

  • pro­duct com­pli­ance (public law),
  • pro­duct lia­bi­li­ty (civil law), and
  • sanc­tion regimes (espe­ci­al­ly the OWiG [Act on Regu­la­to­ry Offen­ces] and cri­mi­nal law).

The OWiG con­ta­ins two spe­ci­fic fea­tures for companies:

Sec­tion 130 OWiG – Breach of Super­vi­so­ry Duties

Com­pa­nies are requi­red to orga­ni­se their ope­ra­ti­ons in such a way that legal vio­la­ti­ons are pre­ven­ted. This includes, among other things:

  • clear allo­ca­ti­on of responsibilities,
  • effec­ti­ve con­trol mecha­nisms (e.g. ran­dom checks),
  • appro­pria­te tech­ni­cal sys­tems, and
  • regu­lar employee training.

Sec­tion 30 OWiG – Cor­po­ra­te Fines

Par­ti­cu­lar­ly rele­vant in prac­ti­ce is Sec­tion 30 OWiG: If a per­son in a mana­ge­ri­al posi­ti­on com­mits a cri­mi­nal or regu­la­to­ry offence, a fine can be impo­sed on the com­pa­ny its­elf. This com­bi­na­ti­on regu­lar­ly leads to dou­ble lia­bi­li­ty: per­so­nal (manage­ment) and insti­tu­tio­nal (the company).

Typi­cal Risks of Fines in Pro­duct Law

The rele­vant fine pro­vi­si­ons ari­se from a multi­tu­de of pro­duct law regu­la­ti­ons. Par­ti­cu­lar­ly com­mon are:

  • Pro­duct safe­ty law (ProdSG / GPSR)
    • delay­ed or omit­ted mar­ket measures,
    • insuf­fi­ci­ent report­ing to authorities,
    • ina­de­qua­te con­su­mer information.
  • Sub­s­tance and che­mi­cals law (e.g. REACH, RoHS)
    • brea­ches of docu­men­ta­ti­on or coope­ra­ti­on duties,
    • pla­cing non-compliant pro­ducts on the market.

Prac­ti­cal examp­les demons­tra­te that such brea­ches can quick­ly trig­ger an escala­ti­on chain: recall obli­ga­ti­ons, offi­ci­al mea­su­res, OWiG pro­cee­dings against the manage­ment, and addi­tio­nal lia­bi­li­ty and insurance-related risks.

The OWiG as Part of a Wider Risk System

The admi­nis­tra­ti­ve offence sanc­tion is rare­ly to be view­ed in iso­la­ti­on. Rather, it regu­lar­ly occurs along­side civil pro­duct lia­bi­li­ty, offi­ci­al mea­su­res (e.g. recalls, sales bans), and eco­no­mic con­se­quen­ces (cos­ts, repu­ta­tio­nal dama­ge, insu­rance gaps).

The actu­al risk the­r­e­fo­re lies less in the fine its­elf than in the sys­te­mic impact along the enti­re value chain.

Com­pli­ance Sys­tems as a Decisi­ve Exo­ne­ra­ting Factor

Cen­tral to avo­i­ding fines under Sec­tion 30 OWiG is an effec­ti­ve Pro­duct Com­pli­ance Manage­ment Sys­tem (PCMS). On 26 May 2026, the Fede­ral Govern­ment published a draft bill to amend Sec­tion 30 OWiG. Fines are to be asses­sed, among other things, accor­ding to the eco­no­mic cir­cum­s­tances of the com­pa­ny as well as whe­ther pre­cau­ti­ons were taken befo­re or after the offence to pre­vent and detect cri­mi­nal or admi­nis­tra­ti­ve offences.

In prac­ti­ce, the fol­lo­wing aspects play a par­ti­cu­lar­ly important role:

  • a trans­pa­rent orga­ni­sa­tio­nal structure,
  • clear respon­si­bi­li­ties, and
  • docu­men­ted con­trol and moni­to­ring mechanisms.

A func­tio­ning com­pli­ance sys­tem can, in indi­vi­du­al cases, pre­clude a breach of super­vi­so­ry duties or at least signi­fi­cant­ly redu­ce the level of a fine.

Admi­nis­tra­ti­ve offence law is no lon­ger a “side­show” in pro­duct law. Pro­duct com­pli­ance is not purely a regu­la­to­ry duty, but a core com­po­nent of risk manage­ment; what mat­ters is not only com­pli­ance with indi­vi­du­al regu­la­ti­ons, but the orga­ni­sa­ti­on of com­pli­ance as a whole.

In prac­ti­ce, it con­sis­t­ent­ly beco­mes clear: it is not the pro­duct defect that is decisi­ve, but whe­ther the com­pa­ny could have pre­ven­ted it through its orga­ni­sa­tio­nal structure.

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