NIS 2 and CER

Dou­ble strike to ward off hybrid threats

In recent years, the­re were num­e­rous cases in which cri­ti­cal infra­struc­tu­re in Euro­pe came under attack. Not least the attack on the Nord­stream 2 Bal­tic Sea pipe­line made head­lines. The Euro­pean Uni­on (EU) respon­ded, among other things, with two legal acts to streng­then the defen­ces of cri­ti­cal infra­struc­tu­re and pro­tect the EU from hybrid attacks.

Pro­tec­tion against hybrid threats

The Cri­ti­cal Enti­ties Resi­li­ence Direc­ti­ve (CER Direc­ti­ve) and the recast of the Direc­ti­ve con­cer­ning mea­su­res for a high com­mon level of secu­ri­ty of net­work and infor­ma­ti­on sys­tems across the Uni­on (her­ein­af­ter: NIS 2 Direc­ti­ve) form a sin­gle enti­ty. The NIS 2 Direc­ti­ve obli­ges important and essen­ti­al enti­ties to take mea­su­res to mini­mi­se cyber­se­cu­ri­ty risks. As the best pro­tec­tion against cyber­th­re­ats can be use­l­ess against phy­si­cal sabo­ta­ge, the CER Direc­ti­ve tar­gets clas­sic thre­ats to cri­ti­cal infra­struc­tu­re. Tog­e­ther, the Direc­ti­ves aim to pro­vi­de com­pre­hen­si­ve pro­tec­tion for cri­ti­cal infra­struc­tu­re by requi­ring it to be resi­li­ent. The con­cept of resi­li­ence is defi­ned in Art. 2 No. 2 of the CER Direc­ti­ve in par­ti­cu­lar as a cri­ti­cal entity’s abili­ty to pre­vent, pro­tect against, respond to and resist an incident.

Scope of application

The sco­pes of appli­ca­ti­on of the CER and NIS 2 Direc­ti­ves are simi­lar. Both Direc­ti­ves con­tain anne­xes lis­ting regu­la­ted sec­tors. The Annex to the CER Direc­ti­ve lar­ge­ly cor­re­sponds to Annex 1 of the NIS 2 Direc­ti­ve. Howe­ver, the scope of the CER Direc­ti­ve is nar­rower, as it only addres­ses cri­ti­cal enti­ties. In order to be con­side­red a cri­ti­cal enti­ty, the enti­ty must be cate­go­ri­sed accor­din­gly by a Mem­ber Sta­te accor­ding to Art. 2 No. 1 of the CER Direc­ti­ve. The CER Direc­ti­ve also spe­ci­fies cri­te­ria for cate­go­ri­sa­ti­on, pur­su­ant to which the Mem­ber Sta­tes, for exam­p­le, are requi­red by Art. 6 (2) © to take into account whe­ther an inci­dent at the enti­ty would have signi­fi­cant dis­rup­ti­ve effects. In the con­text of the NIS 2 Direc­ti­ve, howe­ver, it is not a ques­ti­on of whe­ther the acti­vi­ty in one of the regu­la­ted sec­tors is important enough to be capa­ble of lea­ding to signi­fi­cant dis­rup­ti­ve effects.

Same Same But Different

Alt­hough the Direc­ti­ves have dif­fe­rent objec­ti­ves, the requi­re­ments defi­ned by them are simi­lar: Accor­ding to Art. 12 (1) of the CER Direc­ti­ve, Mem­ber Sta­tes must requi­re cri­ti­cal enti­ties to car­ry out regu­lar risk assess­ments. In addi­ti­on, accor­ding to Art. 13 (1) of the CER Direc­ti­ve, cri­ti­cal enti­ties must take appro­pria­te and pro­por­tio­na­te tech­ni­cal, secu­ri­ty and orga­ni­sa­tio­nal mea­su­res to ensu­re their resi­li­ence, inclu­ding mea­su­res that take the enti­re sup­p­ly chain into account. Even the con­cepts them­sel­ves are simi­lar to the NIS 2 Direc­ti­ve. Art. 21 of the lat­ter also makes appro­pria­te and pro­por­tio­na­te tech­ni­cal, ope­ra­tio­nal and orga­ni­sa­tio­nal mea­su­res to mana­ge the risks posed to the secu­ri­ty of net­work and infor­ma­ti­on sys­tems man­da­to­ry. The tri­ad of risk assess­ment, risk manage­ment mea­su­res (or mea­su­res to streng­then resi­li­ence) and report­ing obli­ga­ti­ons in the event of secu­ri­ty inci­dents are com­mon to both legal acts – a fact that com­pa­nies should take into account in their inter­nal processes.

Con­clu­si­on

Octo­ber is the dead­line for Mem­ber Sta­tes to imple­ment the CER and NIS 2 Direc­ti­ves. This means that com­pa­nies must be pre­pared to imple­ment the neces­sa­ry mea­su­res. The fact that both Direc­ti­ves impo­se on enti­ties expli­cit obli­ga­ti­ons rela­ting to the sup­p­ly chain requi­res a rethink. If they have not done so yet, com­pa­nies should check whe­ther they are sub­ject to the new requi­re­ments. If in doubt, the neces­sa­ry mea­su­res should be imple­men­ted, becau­se even if the­re is no legal obli­ga­ti­on: Com­pa­nies should also have a (com­mer­cial) inte­rest of their own in defen­ding against hybrid threats.

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